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Who Should Deicide? The Conflicting Legal, Ethical, and Moral Dilemmas  
Surrounding the Separation of Conjoined Twins 
 
Introduction and Roadmap 
 Parents and medical professionals involved with the lives of conjoined twins are often 
faced with challenging decisions regarding the treatment, quality of life, and survival of both 
babies. But perhaps the most emotionally intricate of these decisions is whether or not to 
surgically separate the twins. Due to advancements in medical knowledge over the last half 
century, doctors are performing separation procedures previously not thought possible.1 
Nonetheless, cases where conjoined twins share vital organs or have severe abnormalities still 
pose a number of moral, ethical, and legal implications for all of the parties involved.2  
This paper will argue that applying an exclusively legal analysis to cases involving the 
separation of conjoined twins is inadequate and unsuitable to confront the complex dilemmas 
posed by these cases. A court’s role in conjoined twin separation cases should be limited to 
simply advising physicians on the legality of the procedure in question. The decision-making 
authority should be left to the family and the physicians to strike a balance between each twin’s 
interest in life, the opinions of the involved medical professionals, and the parents’ moral beliefs 
and values. Although physicians do not have the same interest in life and interest in caring for 
one’s child as the twins and their parents, doctors have an interest in providing treatment that 
aligns with permissible medical judgment and the standard of care in their field. Thus, an 
 
1 Colleen Davis, Separating Conjoined Twins: A Medical and Criminal Law Dilemma, 17 J. L. & MED. 594, 594 
(2010). 
2 Id.  
intersectional approach that factors in relevant legal, medical, ethical, and moral inquiries better 
serves the interests of the parties involved.  
 Part I of this paper will briefly overview the history of conjoined twins, as well as the 
social awareness towards the condition. Part II will lay out three prominent conjoined twin 
separation cases disseminated in the news: from New England in 2017, Philadelphia in 1977, and 
England in 2001. Each of these cases raised similar issues, but they all had unique resolutions 
due to the objections of the parties involved. Unlike the U.S. examples from Philadelphia and 
New England, the British case resulted in a judicial opinion from three appellate judges on 
England’s Court of Appeals. Part III will examine the difficulties raised by these cases from a 
medical and ethical perspective, highlighting relevant bioethical theories that support or 
challenge the separation of conjoined twins. Lastly, Part IV will examine the substantive law that 
the Lord Justices applied in the English case of Re A (Children) and the consequences from the 
decision.  
I. Conjoined twins from a historical perspective 
Largely due to deep-rooted superstition and the rarity of the condition itself, conjoined 
twins were rarely depicted in the vast artistic representations of the human body that date back 
over 15,000 years.3 Nonetheless, excavations of Tlatilco, a small Mexican village that existed 
3,000 years ago, have discovered extremely accurate clay sculptures depicting babies with facial 
and cranial duplications.4 The Tlatilco sculptures are the first recorded instance of 
developmentally and proportionately correct representations of conjoined twins, and not just 
fictitious hybrids like centaurs.5 At its roots, classical religious theory attempted to explain 
 
3 G.E. Kennedy, The 3,000-Year History of Conjoined Twins, 175 W. J. MED. 176, 76 (2001).  
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
medical abnormalities as warnings from God and reminders of man’s imperfections and original 
sin.6 Unfortunately, conjoined twins were not exempt from this classification and “were long 
thought to be omens of the future or God’s punishment for man’s wickedness.”7 Anecdotal 
writings of viable conjoined twins date back more than 1,000 years in European medical history.8  
The first well-known case of conjoined twins was not documented until 1811, when twin 
boys Chang and Eng were born in Siam, or modern-day Thailand.9 Chang and Eng, connected by 
a band of abdominal tissue, amassed wealth and rose to fame in P.T. Barnum’s traveling circus 
where they were labeled as the “Siamese twins.”10 While traveling in the circus, the twins 
consulted several influential physicians who concluded that a separation procedure would be 
fatal to both boys.11 Throughout their lives, Chang and Eng married sisters, had 21 children 
between them, and became successful farmers and businessmen.12 Ultimately, the twins died 
within hours of each other at the age of 62.13 An autopsy revealed that Chang and Eng shared no 
organs, explaining their longer than normal lifespan.14 Even with their success, the deep-rooted 
stigma and misconception surrounding conjoined twins followed Chang and Eng to death, where 
one of the autopsy examiners referred to them as “monsters.”15  
 
6 Arif Kokcu, Mehmet B. Cetinkaya, Oguz Aydin & Migraci Tosun, Conjoined Twins: Historical Perspective and 
Report of a Case, 20 J. MATERNAL-FETAL & NEONATAL MED. 349, 49 (2007). (St. Augustine’s explanation for 
“gross anomalies”).  
7 J. Raffensperger, A Philosophical Approach to Conjoined Twins, 12 PEDIATRIC SURGERY INT’L 249, 49 (1997).  
8 Kennedy at 176.  
9 Id.  
10 Kokcu, et al. at 350.   
11 Id.  
12 See Kennedy at 176; See also Raffensperger at 249. 
13 Kennedy at 176. 
14 Id. 
15 See Raffensperger at 249. See also Julian Savulescu, Conjoined Twins: Philosophical Problems and Ethical 
Challenges, 41 J. MED. PHIL. 41-55, 43 (2016) (quoting a 1928 article from the Lancet, a well-respected medical 
journal, which commented on a conjoined twin case. The article stated, “[t]he monster here described was born at 
full term and survived four and a half days; its two components behaved as two separate individuals and died within 
a few minutes of each other”). 
By the middle of the twentieth century, separation attempts slowly became more 
prevalent. In the 1950s, there were 16 reports of separation procedures, with 13 known operative 
survivors.16 Today, a conjoined birth is still an extremely rare medical phenomenon, occurring 
only once in every 200,000 live births.17 The overall survival rate of conjoined twins is between 
5% to 25%, with about 75% of surgical separations resulting in at least one twin surviving.18   
Understandably, the individual facts of each case are the driving force in determining the 
projected survival rate and whether separation is recommended.19 For the purposes of this article, 
the subsequent case discussion and analysis will focus on scenarios where separation is highly 
recommended by physicians because the twins share vital organs, with the more dependent twin 
often draining the resources from physically stronger twin.       
II. Background facts from three prominent examples  
 This section will discuss three prominent conjoined twin separation cases that 
demonstrate the medical, ethical, and legal issues that will be highlighted throughout this article. 
Although each of these cases raised similar issues, they all concluded in different ways based on 
the objections from the parties involved. The first case from New England in 2017 demonstrates 
the difficulties for medical professionals, even when the doctors and parents agree on the need 
for treatment and surgical separation. Although the stakes were still high from a medical and 
ethical standpoint, the legal and parental interests were much lower because the parents 
consented. The second case from Philadelphia in 1977 depicts an instance where all of the parties 
raised unique hesitations with separation. In this case, the parties turned to religious leaders and 
 
16 Raffensperger at 249. 
17 Jen Christensen, Parents Make Difficult Decision to Keep Conjoined Twins Together, CNN, Apr. 25, 2014, 
https://www.cnn.com/2014/04/24/health/conjoined-twins-will-stay-together/index.html. 
18 Id.  
19 I.e., twins with several shared organs have a much lower survival rate compared to twins with no shared organs, 
like Chang and Eng above. 
the courts for acceptance and authorization before conducting the surgery. Third, the 2001 case 
from Britain shows the inadequacy of attempting to apply legal principles to a case where the 
parents of the twins deeply disagreed with the hospital’s recommendation of performing a 
separation procedure. These cases will serve as the backdrop for the subsequent sections on the 
medical, ethical, and legal concerns that arise and overlap in these life-and-death scenarios.      
A. 2017 New England case of “Twin A and Twin B”  
In late 2017, a New England hospital was confronted with a rare dilemma. Twenty-two-
month-old conjoined twins connected by the abdomen and pelvis came to the U.S. to seek 
treatment or possible separation.20 The twins, hereafter Twin A and Twin B, were born with a 
long list of medical abnormalities that made their case difficult for doctors to analyze and treat: 
the twins had three legs, one of which was separated; they shared a single liver; each had one 
complete kidney, which drained into a single bladder, and one undersized kidney; finally, their 
gastrointestinal tracts were fused together with a shared anus and one vagina. 21  
At the outset, Twin B was clearly larger than the other; she was alert; and she often 
interacted with caregivers.22 Twin A, on the other hand, was physically smaller, was less active, 
and was not able to engage with the caregivers to the extent of her sister. After undergoing 
medical evaluation at the New England hospital, it became clear that Twin A was dying and was 
slowly killing her sister. Doctors believed that “Twin B is normal and living relatively healthy 
and we know that she can live without her sister, whereas Twin A relies completely on her sister. 
 
20 Ashley Welch, Doctors Face Heartbreaking Decision, Can Only Save One Twin, CBS NEWS, Oct. 26, 2017, 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/doctors-heartbreaking-decision-conjoined-twins/. 
21 Id. 
22 Id.; See also CBC Radio, Conjoined Twins and a Doctor’s Dilemma: Is It Ever Morally Acceptable to Sacrifice 
One Child for Another?, CBC RADIO, Mar. 8, 2018, https://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-march-8-
2018-1.4567264/conjoined-twins-and-a-doctor-s-dilemma-is-it-ever-morally-acceptable-to-sacrifice-one-child-for-
another-1.4567966. 
Her sister is her life support.” (Emphasis added).23 Twin A became progressively sicker, with 
several episodes of respiratory troubles that required admission into the ICU. At this point, the 
doctors agreed that Twin A would not survive a surgical separation from her sister. Twin A’s 
declining health status also meant that she would most likely die if she remained conjoined with 
her sister. If Twin A died while still attached to her sister, it would result in the inevitable death 
of both twins because of the stress that it would place on Twin B’s system and body.24  
Faced with this situation, the hospital assembled a “pediatric ethics committee” to 
analyze the case and weigh their options.25  Committee discussions led to the conclusion that 
“while each twin should be regarded as a distinct individual, there was little to no chance of 
saving the smaller twin; yet not attempting the separation surgery would risk her sister’s life, as 
well.”26 After discussions with the team of doctors and support from a religious leader, the 
parents made the decision to proceed with the surgery. Ultimately, the 14-hour surgery went as 
originally predicted: After separation of the twins’ pelvic structure, the surgeons divided the 
arterial connection and Twin A’s blood pressure and oxygen levels dropped, resulting in her 
death.27 
 
23 Id.  
24 Id.  
25 Ideally, pediatrics ethics committees should be made up of individuals from various disciplines including 
medicine, nursing, law, clergy, social work, behavioral sciences, and ethics/philosophy that aid physicians and/or 
parents in resolving disputes or when facing difficult ethical decisions. The role of an ethics committee is to help 
those making these difficult decisions understand the ethical issues that may be involved, to facilitate discussion, 
and to often make specific recommendations to the parties.  A committee generally does not carry direct decision-
making authority, but rather serves solely in an advisory role. Although physicians and parents are typically 
informed that they are under no obligations to follow the recommendations of the committee, the opinions of the 
committee often carry significant influence or “moral authority.”  It is important to note that ethics committees 
should not serve as, or replace, the role of legal counsel. A sharp line should be drawn between the distinct 
questions, “is it legal?” and “is it ethically permissible?” M.R. Mercurio, The Role of a Pediatric Ethics Committee 
in the Newborn Intensive Care Unit, 31 J. PERINATOLOGY 1-9 (2011).  
26 Id.  
27 Id. 
The 2017 case at the New England hospital involving “Twin A and B” demonstrates the 
weighty moral dilemmas that attach to the medical decisions in deciding whether or not to 
separate conjoined twins. Although not addressed directly, the case also raises several questions 
regarding the potential legal ramifications of separating conjoined twins. The doctor that 
performed the separation procedure said that she left the operating room “crying” and that “it 
was not easy,” but ultimately, she did not regret it because there was a life saved and the parents 
were thrilled.28 Arthur Caplan, Ph.D., the head of the Division of Medical Ethics at NYU School 
of Medicine said that “when it comes to the decision about whether to perform separation 
surgery on conjoined twins, ‘there’s no one-size-fits-all answer’… the issue is how are the twins 
conjoined.”29 The decisional significance at the forefront of conjoined twins cases often rests on 
asking if it is acceptable to “remove” one twin as a means to save the other.  
B. 1977 case at the Children’s Hospital in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  
 In October of 1977, the first prominent case highlighting the issues surrounding the 
separation of conjoined twins took place at the Children’s Hospital in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania.30 Dr. C. Everett Koop performed a unique separation of what was then known as, 
“Siamese” twins at the Children’s Hospital in Philadelphia.31 Although Dr. Koop performed 
successful separation surgeries before, this was different because the twins shared a single 
 
28 Id.  
29 Id. 
30 Francis X. Meehan, The Siamese Twin Operation and Contemporary Catholic Medical Ethics, 45 LINACRE Q. 
157, 157 (1978). 
31 The reference to the twins as “Siamese twins” highlights the strong influence that the case of Chang and Eng had 
on popular culture and society. While the name has maintained cultural significance for the better part of two 
centuries, the classification still broadly stereotypes many conjoined twins. (See Part I of this paper for a more 
detailed explanation of Chang and Eng’s story).  
heart.32 The physicians had advised the parents that they had to “sacrifice” one twin so that the 
other could live. If the twins remain conjoined, they would both die.33  
The parents in this case were deeply devout practitioners of Judaism and objected to the 
thought of “sacrificing” one child as a means to save the other.34 Both parents made it clear they 
would not consent to the separation without rabbinical support.35 As a response, rabbinic 
scholars used two analogies to justify the separation. The first analogy concerned two men who 
jumped form a burning airplane. One man’s parachute failed to open and while free falling he 
grasped the leg of the other whose chute could not sustain the weight of both. The thrust of the 
scholars’ question was whether both men in the analogy must die or if one of the men can kick 
away the second man to save himself.36 The rabbis replied that it was acceptable for the first man 
(with the working parachute) to “free himself” since the second man was already destined for 
death. The second analogy that the rabbis set forth involved a caravan surrounded by bandits 
who demanded a specified individual be turned over for execution as a condition for letting the 
others go. As in the first example, the rabbis determined the since the targeted individual was 
already “destined for death,” there was no moral issue in turning the individual over to the 
bandits.37 
In addition to the objections from the parents of the twins, the Catholic nurses at the 
hospital refused to participate in the surgery without assurance from the archdiocese of 
 
32 Id. at 157-64. 
33 Id.  
34 J.J. Paris & A.C. Elias-Jones, Do We Murder Mary to Save Jodie? An Ethical Analysis of the Separation of the 
Manchester Conjoined Twins, 77 POSTGRAD MED. J. 593, 94 (2001). 
35 Id. 
36 George J. Annas, At Law: Siamese Twins: Killing One to Save the Other, 17 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 27, 27 
(1987). 
37 J.J. Paris & A.C. Elias-Jones, Do We Murder Mary to Save Jodie? An Ethical Analysis of the Separation of the 
Manchester Conjoined Twins, 77 POSTGRAD MED. J. 593, 94 (2001). 
Philadelphia regarding the moral acceptability of “killing” one twin to save the other.38 In 
approving the operation, the Catholic authorities in Philadelphia based their position on the 
doctrine of “double effect.” The principle of double effect is a theory first formulated by Thomas 
Aquinas in the 13th century as a justification for self-defense. It holds that while “one may never 
directly intend an evil act (such as killing an innocent person), the evil effect (the death) may be 
permitted if the effect is not intended in itself but is an indirect consequence, justified by a 
commensurate reason.”39  
Lastly, the pediatric surgeon, Dr. Koop, refused to perform the surgery without judicial 
approval and legal immunity from potential charges of homicide.40 A judge in the Philadelphia 
Family Court insisted that a three-judge panel hear Dr. Koop’s petition. The panel quickly 
rejected the first argument from the hospital that “because the twins only had one heart, there 
was only one person and thus no ‘killing’ would occur if the twins were separated.”41 The 
lawyers’ second argument before the panel was similar to the rabbis’ two analogies above. The 
hospital’s lawyers provided the panel with an example of two mountain climbers who were 
attached to each other by a rope. One climber slipped and was caught dangling at the end of the 
rope. The other partner was unable to pull the climber to safety no matter how hard he tried. If 
the rope remained uncut, the secure climber would soon tire, and both would subsequently fall 
and die.42 Similar to the justification that the rabbis gave the parents, the hospital’s lawyers 
argued that it was legitimate for the secure climber to cut the rope to save himself. Confronted 
with these dilemmas, the panel in the Family Court deliberated only for a few minutes before 
 
38 Id.  
39 Id.  
40 Id.  
41 Id.  
42 Id. 
authorizing the surgery.43 The surgical procedure itself was successful, but the surviving twin 
died three months after the separation.44 
 C. 2001 British case of “Jodie and Mary” 
 In August of 2000, the first legal case involving the separation of conjoined twins took 
place in a British courtroom.45 The Re A (Children) case centered around a fundamental dispute 
regarding the “separation of conjoined twins which divided the scientific, legal and religious 
sectors of society.”46  
Conjoined twins, Jodie and Mary, were born on August 8, 2000 to Maltese parents 
Michelangelo and Rina Attard, who were devout Roman Catholics.47 Each twin had her own 
arms and legs but shared a linked spine. Besides a shared bladder, the girls had their own internal 
organs.48 A hospital in Manchester, England agreed to assume care of the twins and decide 
whether a separation surgery was medically feasible. Issues quickly arose because Jodie’s heart 
operated the circulatory functions for both girls.49 Doctors believed that the excessive stress on 
Jodie’s heart would result in their untimely death within a matter of weeks. As the more 
independent twin, doctors predicted that Jodie could survive on her own if separated from Mary. 
However, this prediction meant that Mary would certainly die during the procedure.50  
 
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
45 Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) No. 1, [2000] H.R.L.R. 721 (C.A.Civ.); In re A 
(Children)(Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation), [2001] Fam. 147 (C.A. Civ.); Re A (Children) (Conjoined 
Twins: Surgical Separation) [2000] 4 All E.R. 961 (C.A. Civ.).  
46 Heather Tierney, Conjoined Twins: The Conflict Between Parents and the Courts Over the Medical Treatment of 
Children, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 458, 459 (2002). 
47 The names “Jodi and Mary” were fictional names given to the twins by the British court. The girls’ real names 
were Gracie and Rose. See George J. Annas, Conjoined Twins—The Limits of Law at the Limits of Life, 344 N. 
ENGL. J. MED. 1104 (2001). 
48 Tierney at 459-60.  
49 Id.; Re A (Children), 4 All E.R. 961 (C.A. Civ.). 
50 Id. 
Jodie and Mary’s parents raised both religious, financial, and quality of life objections to 
the hospital’s offer to perform the separation procedure.51 As devout Catholics, Jodie and Mary’s 
parents believed that God, not doctors, should decide whether their daughters lived or died.52 The 
parents also raised the argument that if Jodie survived, she would be left with severe 
disabilities.53 They noted that there were few, if any, facilities on their remote home island to 
care for a disabled child. Essentially, there was no chance for the child “to have any sort of life at 
all.”54 Furthermore, the parents did not have the financial resources to provide Jodie’s medical 
treatment at home.55 Without the financial means and medical resources to care for their child, 
Jodie would have to stay in England to receive treatment. These factors all weighed heavily in 
the parents’ ultimate decision to reject the hospital’s offer to perform the separation.56 
   Following the parents’ objections, the physicians turned the case over to the British 
court to receive authorization (over the parents’ wishes) for the separation procedure.57 In the 
United States, the decision of the parents is typically final unless the physicians or the state 
demonstrates abuse or neglect.58 However, unlike their U.S. counterparts, British law leaves the 
decision to a judge to decide “what the welfare or best interests of the child require by exercising 
‘an independent and objective judgement.’”59 At the trial level, the judge concluded that the 
separation would be in the “best interest” of both children and this was not a case of “killing one 
 
51 J.J. Paris & A.C. Elias-Jones, Do We Murder Mary to Save Jodie? An Ethical Analysis of the Separation of the 
Manchester Conjoined Twins, 77 POSTGRAD MED. J. 593, 95 (2001). 
52 See Re A Children (Conjoined Twins Case), note 4, at 726. As devout Roman Catholics, the parent believed that 
the lives of their children “must be left in God’s hands.”  
53 Paris & Elias-Jones at 595. 
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Id. 
57 Id.  
58 George J. Annas, Conjoined Twins—The Limits of Law at the Limits of Life, 344 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1104, 04 
(2001). 
59 Id.; See also Re A (Children) 4 All E.R. 961 (C.A. Civ.).  
to save the other,” but rather one of passive euthanasia.60 The parents and the official solicitor 
(chosen to represent Mary) ultimately appealed the decision of the lower Family Court.61 
At the appellate level, each of the three judges on the panel issued a separate opinion. All 
three judges agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the separation should be performed, but 
“none of the three judges on the appeals panel fully agreed with one another’s legal reasoning.”62 
This disagreement demonstrates the difficulty with attempting to apply exclusively legal 
principals to issues that intersect the law, morality, and medical ethics.  
 Lord Justice Alan Ward started his opinion by pronouncing that it is a fundamental 
principle of medical law to allow people the opportunity to decide for themselves whether or not 
to receive medical treatment.63 In the case of a minor, British parents typically have a right and 
duty to determine whether to consent or withhold medical treatment for their children. British 
jurisprudence provides a safeguard for the courts to override the parents’ decision if it is in the 
child’s “best interest.”64 LJ Ward proclaimed that the paramount consideration is determining the 
best interest and the welfare of the children.65 In coming to his conclusion, LJ Ward agreed with 
the lower court that it was in Jodie’s best interest to have the operation but disagreed that the 
surgery can be considered a passive “omission” of treatment.66 Quite simply, he viewed the 
procedure as an active surgical procedure that would effectively end Mary’s life. Ward did not 
attempt to justify the affirmative “killing” of Mary as being in her “best interest.” Rather, he 
focused his analysis on choosing between the lesser of two evils.67 
 
60 Re A (Children) 4 All E.R. 961 (C.A. Civ.). 
61 Id.  
62 Annas at 1104.  
63 Tierney at 459-60; Re A (Children) 4 All E.R. 961 (C.A. Civ.). 
64 Id. 
65 Annas at 1104. 
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
Attempting to ground his decision in legal precedent, LJ Ward stated that Mary was, in 
essence, “killing” her sister. Thus, the act of killing Mary through surgical separation was a case 
of “quasi self-defense.”68 LJ Ward believed that “Mary may have a right to life, but she has little 
right to be alive. She is [only] alive because…she [parasitically] sucks the lifeblood out of Jodie. 
If Jodie could speak, she would surely protest, ‘Stop it, Mary, you’re killing me.’”69  
 Lord Justice Robert Brooke agreed with LJ Ward regarding the ultimate decision to 
separate Mary and Jodie. But for LJ Brooke, the issues relating to criminal law required a more 
in-depth analysis to rationalize the separation procedure in the law.70 LJ Brooke began his 
analysis by questioning whether the operation to separate the girls was in-fact lawful. In 
answering this question, LJ Brooke looked at the legal definition of murder and its relevant 
exceptions. LJ Brooke concluded that although the surgery itself would constitute murder under 
the law, the exception for the defense of “necessity” justified the procedure.71  
 The third judge on the Court of Appeals panel, Lord Justice Robert Walker, noted that the 
religious objections of the parents, although controversial, were “not obviously contrary to any 
view generally accepted in our society.”72 With that being said, LJ Walker paid a great deal of 
deference to the opinions of the medical professionals who testified at the trial.73 LJ Walker 
believed the doctors’ assertion that the separation surgery was the best way to “save” Jodie, 
regardless of whether the court could determine the legality of the operation.74 Although Walker 
agreed that necessity was an important factor in analyzing the case, he found no analogous cases 
 
68 Id. at 1105 (citing to Re A (Children) 4 All E.R. 961 (C.A. Civ.)) 
69 Id.  
70 Id.; See also Tierney at 464-65. 
71 Id.; See also Tierney at 464-65. 
72 J.J. Paris & A.C. Elias-Jones, Do We Murder Mary to Save Jodie? An Ethical Analysis of the Separation of the 
Manchester Conjoined Twins, 77 POSTGRAD MED. J. 593, 97 (2001). 
73 Heather Tierney, Conjoined Twins: The Conflict Between Parents and the Courts Over the Medical Treatment of 
Children, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 458, 467 (2002) 
74 Id.  
that supported using the defense in conjoined twin separation cases.75 In sum, Walker found that 
“there is no helpful analogy or parallel to…this case.”76 The distinct circumstance in this, and 
other conjoined twin cases, led walker to rely heavily on the opinion of the “highly skilled and 
conscientious doctors [who] believe that the best course, in the interest of both twins, is to 
undertake elective surgery in order to separate them and save Jodie.”77 
 In sum, England’s Court of Appeals dismissed the parents’ appeal and gave the hospital 
authorization to perform the surgery.78 The surgery was performed just six weeks after the Court 
of Appeal’s decision. As predicted, Mary died during the procedure, but Jodie survived and 
returned home with her parents.79     
III. Issues from a medical and ethical perspective  
 The practice of “medicine” is often defined as the “science or practice of the diagnosis, 
treatment, and prevention of disease” or “the science and the art dealing with the maintenance of 
health and the prevention, alleviation, or cure of disease.”80 These definitions depict the practice 
of medicine as a field or occupation primary concerned with the preservation of life. Cases 
regarding the separation of conjoined twins, much like other termination of life cases, clearly 
diverge from these traditional medical principles.  
In the three cases discussed above, the doctors owed conflicting duties to each of the 
twins: “saving” the stronger twin meant “killing” the more dependent twin; “prolonging” the life 
of the more dependent twin meant “shortening” the life of the stronger twin. Faced with this 
dilemma, medical professionals must consider the distinct and personalized circumstances of 
 
75 Id.  
76 Annas at 1106; Re A (Children) at 1066-67.  
77 Id.  
78 Tierney at 467. 
79 Id.  
80 Noun; definition from Google and noun; definition from Webster’s online dictionary, respectively.  
each case that comes before them, prior to recommending a separation surgery to parents or 
seeking court intervention. Often, ethic committees in hospitals are assembled to address these 
concerns prior to recommending treatment or conducting surgical procedures.81 Among other 
medical inquires, these ethics committees often decide if each twin should be regarded as a 
distinct individual and if there are any chances, however small, to save the weaker, dependent 
twin.82  
An initial issue that confronts medical professionals when confronted with conjoined 
twin cases is whether the twins are considered one or two individuals. There appears to be no 
definitive answer to this question within the medical field.83 Although doctors typically view a 
fetus with one head and duplicative arms or legs as a single human being, some doctors are split 
as to whether a fetus with two independent heads (or a shared body) can be classified as the 
same.84 Additionally, both parents and doctors typically agree that a “functional and independent 
brain is the essence of existence.” Thus, a conservative definition of a conjoined twin is an 
individual with a separate (or, almost separate) brain, who has the independent ability to 
communicate. 85 Obviously, following this definition has drastic implications in the separation 
decision-making process. On one hand, a conjoined twin without its own head would not be seen 
as an independent human being. Rather, they are viewed ethically as a “tissue parasite or 
teratoma conjoined to a single human being.”86 On the other hand, if two human beings are 
believed to be present, then ethical considerations come into play that seek the protection of both 
 
81 Ashley Welch, Doctors Face Heartbreaking Decision, Can Only Save One Twin, CBS NEWS, Oct. 26, 2017, 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/doctors-heartbreaking-decision-conjoined-twins/. 
82 Id. 
83 Prof. John Pearn, M.D., Bioethical Issues in Caring for Conjoined Twins and Their Parents, 357 LANCET 1968, 
68 (2001). 
84 Id.  
85 Id.  
86 Id.; See also Dr. Enas Qutieshat, The Legal Personality of Conjoined Twins, 9 EURO. J. BUS. & MGMT. 88, 94 
(2017).  
lives, weighing the risks and benefits to each twin as a result of a separation procedure (i.e., 
bodily integrity and the principle of double effect ), and the principles of parental autonomy 
concerning conjoined twins.87  
In the medical field, the distinction between two individual persons typically hinges on 
the physical nature of the attachment. Some ethical scholars differ and propose that all conjoined 
twins are two individuals, psychologically separate but, by degrees, with a shared body.88 Under 
this view, a conjoined twin’s body is not something they are in competition over, rather the body 
is something that they both have an interest in and neither has exclusive rights to it.89 Although 
factoring in this argument may often lead to the conclusion that separation is still necessary in 
difficult cases like that of Mary and Jodie, this approach would not involve “having to think of 
one twin as somehow preying and being a problem for the other” or presupposing that separation 
is automatically in the twins’ “best interest.”90 In viewing conjoined twins as two separate 
individuals with pitting interests, the medical field and several Lord Justices on the British Court 
of Appeals overlook the actual reality of the condition itself: conjoined twins are not separate 
and never have been.91 
The impact on a twin’s bodily integrity is another fundamental ethical consideration that 
parents, doctors, and courts must evaluate in determining whether a separation procedure is 
proper or lawful.92 In short, bodily integrity refers to “the right not to have your body touched or 
your body interfered with without your consent.93 In cases involving the separation of a stronger 
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and weaker conjoined twin, there appears to be a clear violation of this right to bodily integrity, 
no matter if the twins are conjoined or surgically separated. In a conjoined state, the nature of the 
medical condition itself physically deprives a twin from enjoying their own, independent, bodily 
function and integrity.94 In the alternative, undergoing a separation surgery clearly deprives the 
more susceptible twin of bodily integrity because “she will be dead before she can enjoy her 
independence.”95 
Furthermore, ethical considerations in cases concerning the separation of conjoined twins 
often invoke the doctrine of double effect.96 St. Thomas Aquinas first formulated the principle in 
the 13th century as a justification for self-defense.97 The principle of “double effect can be used 
as a justification of a harmful effect if ‘the harmful effect is seen as an indirect or merely 
foreseen effect, not the direct and intended effect of the actions.’”98 More simply, this principle 
allows for death to be foreseen, but not intended.99 They are four main conditions for the 
application of the principle of double effect to apply: (1) The action in itself must be good or at 
least morally indifferent; (2) The agent must intend only the good effect and no the evil effect. 
The evil effect is foreseen, not intended; (3) The evil effect cannot be a means to the good effect; 
and (4) there must be a proportionality between the good and evil effect of the action.100 The 
principle of “double effect” is often used as a means to weigh the risks and benefits to each twin 
if they were to undergo a separation procedure.  
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Since Aquinas’ conception of the principle of “double effect,” subsequent ethical and 
theological scholars believed that the four aforementioned conditions must always be satisfied 
for the principle to apply.101 But, “not all of these criteria are always met in [cases involving] the 
separation of conjoined twins.”102 Taking the four elements of the principle literally, some 
ethical scholars believe that double effect will “never apply to a separation surgery that requires 
the killing or euthanization of one of the twins.103  
Issues surrounding parental autonomy and consent for separation surgeries is also at the 
heart of the ethical analysis.104 While parents feel violated if their consent is removed, society 
has a significant interest in preventing active “euthanasia” of infants.105 Ethical scholar John 
Pearn argues that “if surgery were to be undertaken against parents’ wishes, it should be done 
only after all attempts to reach an agreement between the parents and society have failed.”106 It 
seems that there is a fine line between giving parents the right to choose what they think is best 
for their children and society protecting the safety of children who have the ability to receive 
potentially lifesaving treatment. (Emphasis added).  
The three cases discussed above each involved conjoined twins classified by doctors as 
two independent human beings. Therefore, in all three cases presented, the ethical considerations 
previously listed must be analyzed. In the 2017 case in New England, the twins were connected 
by the abdomen and pelvis. Further, there was also evidence in the case that both twins interacted 
with their caregivers (although the one twin interacted more regularly) and thus had the 
 
101 Prof. John Pearn, M.D., Bioethical Issues in Caring for Conjoined Twins and Their Parents, 357 LANCET 1968, 
69 (2001). 
102 Id.  
103 Wenkel at 298. “According to the first criteria, the nature of the act is killing a person and is thus a wrong. 
According to the second and third criteria, the killing of a person is being used in a way to benefit another and is 
thus wrong. According to the fourth criteria, the killing of a person entails disproportionate effects.”  
104 Pearn at 1969.  
105 Id.  
106 Id. 
independent ability to communicate.107 Similarly, in the 1977 Philadelphia case, the issue 
revolved around the fact that the twins shared a single heart. Lastly, there is no question that 
Jodie and Mary were considered two independent individuals by their parents, the medical 
professionals, and the lord justices on the Court of Appeals. More specially, the three lord 
justices found this question compelling in their opinions and they each came to the conclusion 
(albeit through different legal avenues) that Mary (the weaker twin) was a separate individual 
from her sister, capable of being killed.108 
The issue of bodily integrity was also at the forefront of LJ Ward’s analysis in 
determining whether a surgical separation would bring Mary any benefit in Re A (Children).109 
LJ Ward persisted that, although there was an interference with Mary’s bodily integrity while 
conjoined with her sister, the idea that a separation surgery would give her more integrity is 
“wholly illusory goal because she will be dead before she can enjoy her independence.”110  
Two out of the three aforementioned cases contain justifications grounded in the principle 
of double effect. First, in the 1977 Philadelphia case, the Catholic authorities who approved the 
operation grounded their position in the doctrine of double effect because the unintended evil 
effect of the separation (death of the dependent/weaker twin) was indirect and justified by a 
commensurate reason.111 Second, Lord Justice Walker’s opinion regarding the case of Jodie and 
Mary also used the doctrine of double effect as a means to justify the surgery.112 LJ Walker 
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pointed out that since the principle essentially holds that death may be foreseen but not intended, 
the doctrine can be used to excuse a doctor’s mere foresight of accelerated death from 
constituting intent to murder.113 In phrasing the issue, it is important to classify the imminent 
death of the dependent twin as an “accelerated,” and not as an “intended” consequence of the 
surgery or doctor. Ultimately, whether the double effect applies to a separation surgery (where 
one twin will likely die) depends on the phrasing of the issue and the ability to shoehorn the facts 
into the requisite four elements of the ethical principle.  
IV. Substantive Legal Analysis 
Examining the inconsistent judicial opinions in Re A (Children) demonstrates the 
inadequacies that result from using traditional legal principals to answer a multifaceted problem 
that spans across medicine, ethics, religion, as well as the law. Nonetheless, it is important to 
analyze how the substantive legal theories relied on in the case came up short.  
Arguably, the most significant shortcoming of the Re A (Children) decision was the 
inability of the judges to rest their decision regarding the legality of the separation surgery on 
any legal principle.114 The judges appeared to pick and choose different legal theories to 
shoehorn in the authorization of the separation procedure and defer to the doctors. As a result, 
the decision provides no guidance to other courts on how to rule in conjoined twin separation 
cases. Rather, this case awards the lord justices an extraordinary role to make substantial ethical, 
moral, and medical decisions that should be exclusively reserved for the parents and doctors of 
conjoined twins. Legal scholar George Annas maintains that “if the circumstance of [Re A 
(children)] were duplicated tomorrow …, the physicians involved could, on the basis of the 
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reasoning of this case (and contrary to its conclusion), decided to follow the wishes of the 
parents and let both twins die.115 Although, the court’s ruling gives a great deal of deference to 
medical professionals in deciding what is “perfectly acceptable” under the circumstances, judges 
should not be the final decider in authorizing life-and-death separation surgeries.116 
Several of the justices attempted to apply the criminal law defense of “necessity,” which 
laid dormant in English law until the court’s decision.117 Lord Justice Brooke based his 
application of necessity by distinguishing this case with the classic, 1884 case of R v. Dudley & 
Stephens.118 In Dudley, a boat crew escaped a sinking ship without enough food to survive. 
Faced with impending starvation, the crew killed and ate the youngest and weakest surviving 
crew member. Just four days after killing the boy, the remaining crew members were rescued 
and arrested for murder. During the murder trial, the crew members justified the murder out of 
necessity for their own survival. The court concluded that killing “the weakest, the youngest, the 
most unresisting” life to save one’s own life does not justify murder. Therefore, the members of 
the crew were charged with murder and sentenced to death.119 Lord Justice Brooke opined that 
the case of “Jodie and Mary” was drastically different than the facts of Dudley because the 
“victim in that case was not already destined for death as Mary was.120  
Although the defense of necessity was rejected in Dudley, LJ Brooke suggested that 
certain circumstances allow for the defense.121 LJ Brooke stated that three conditions had to be 
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met for the defense of necessity to apply: (1) the act is needed to avoid inevitable and irreparable 
evil; (2) no more should be done than is reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose; and (3) the 
evil inflicted must not be disproportionate to the evil avoided.122 In applying these principles to 
Jodie and Mary’s circumstances, LJ Brooke concluded that the surgery was necessary to avoid 
the inevitable and irreparable harm to Jodie. As a way to limit the potential for abuse of the 
necessity defense, Lord Justice Brooke limited his holding to conjoined twin cases where doctors 
can place the relevant facts before the court for pre-surgery approval.123 Nonetheless, it was left 
up to the three lord justices to decide the fate of Jodie and Mary. 
The first issue with LJ Brooke applying, and ultimately evolving, the defense of 
“necessity” to Jodie and Mary’s case is that it is based solely on his opinion that Mary 
“designated herself for death.”124 A more plausible explanation is that “Mary did not designate 
herself for anything, she was simply born and survived.”125 Outside of LJ Brooke interweaving 
his personal views into the holding of the case, the use of the “necessity” defense appears to be 
so specialized that its effect is unlikely to extend beyond the narrow context.126 Once again, this 
illuminates the lord justices’ inability to firmly and adequately ground their decision in principles 
of law.127 As would have likely been the case in the United States, the Court in the case of Jodie 
and Mary should have exercised more judicial restraint before simply deferring to the decision of 
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the doctors and authorizing the surgery. In the United States, the decision of the parents is 
typically final unless the physicians or the government demonstrates abuse or neglect.128    
On a completely different end of the spectrum, LJ Walker and LJ Ward sidestepped the 
necessity defense application because they found it unsupported by the context and the analogies 
raised in the case. Rather, LJ Walker moved away from common law exceptions for murder and 
attempted to use the ethical principle of “double effect” to justify the separation.129 While 
“double effect” has been invoked by the United States Supreme Court in a footnote as a 
justification for the administration of pain-relieving drugs to patients receiving palliative care, its 
foundation in the law has not extended to cases involving conjoined twins outside of the Re A 
(Children) context.130 Additionally, LJ Ward saw the lawfulness of the surgery hinging of a 
theory of “quasi self-defense,” which he “modified to meet the quite exception circumstances 
nature has inflicted on the twins.”131 On its face, it appears that all three of lord justices 
interlaced their own personal views into their opinions by tailoring distinct legal principals to 
ultimately reach the same conclusion of authorizing the separation.  
In coming to their decision, the British Court of Appeals totally superseded the cultural, 
religious, and economic wishes of Jodie and Mary’s parents. The British Court’s overly 
paternalistic reasoning and conclusion essentially caused the parents’ role to vanish from the 
decision-making process altogether. LJ Ward was clearly the hardest on the parents, using the 
analogy of a parent at the gates of a concentration camp when attempting to rationalize the 
situation.132 In his analogy, the Nazi doctor in charge of determining who dies and who can work 
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or be used in medical experiments tells the parent that both her children will be killed if she does 
not choose one to save.133 LJ Ward persists that, like Jodie and Mary’s parents, the parent in the 
analogy must choose a child to save.134 (Emphasis added).  The first troubling aspect of LJ 
Ward’s analysis is his conclusion that a parent must choose which child will die when only one 
can be saved.135 Clearly, LJ Ward’s oversimplification of the situation does not fully consider 
how difficult of a situation this is for parents of conjoined twins. The second and more unsettling 
component is that LJ Ward appears to apply “concentration-camp” ethics to reach his conclusion 
in deferring to the British physicians.136 Besides the inability to firmly ground the decision in 
operative law or common law principles, LJ Ward’s decision exemplifies judicial activism and is 
based partly on insensitive personal opinion.  
The Court in Re A (Children) not only answered the case according to their own personal 
views, but it also established weak precedent for future cases concerning conjoined twins.137 The 
shoehorning of common law principles provides no clarity for future courts and litigators in 
deciding these complex dilemmas. The inconsistences raised by Re A (Children) begs the 
question, what should a court’s role be in cases concerning the separation of conjoined twins? A 
more rational approach would be to withhold the courts from making the ultimate decision in 
separation cases. By placing courts in an advisory role, they would have the ability to comment 
on and determine whether a proposed procedure is legally permissible, but go no further.138 
There is a clear distinction between a court determining whether a particular course of action, 
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chosen by the parents and physicians, is legally permissible and whether a particular medical 
procedure is required by law.139 (Emphasis added). The decision to separate should be left to the 
physicians and the parents of the conjoined twins, even in situations where one of the babies will 
likely die. If the physicians and parents cannot come to an agreement, then respecting the 
decision and beliefs of the parents, outside of those constituting neglect, is the most reasonable. 
Prior to asking a court whether a procedure is legally permissible, it is important for the parties to 
consult both ethics committees and legal counsel as a means to assess the potential implications. 
This proposed framework breaks away from the court-driven and highly personalized reasoning 
used throughout Re A (Children), and ultimately places the decision-making authority in the 
hands of the parties where it belongs most: the family and the treating physicians.  
Conclusion  
 It is clear that the law, by itself, is inadequate and inappropriate to answer the life-and-
death questions raised in cases involving the separation and care of conjoined twins. Judges 
alone should not be elevated to the role of deciding what is medically, ethically, and morally 
“right” or “wrong” as the court did in Re A (Children). First, there are no “right” or “wrong” 
answers in these cases, and second, these substantial choices should be left to the parents and the 
treating physicians of conjoined twins. The 2017 case of “Twin A and Twin B” in New England 
demonstrates what happens when the parties consider fundamental ethical principles, the 
independent moral beliefs of the parents, as well as the professional recommendations of doctors. 
Additionally, the 1977 case in demonstrates how the court should be used as a last resort to 
merely determine the legality of a separation procedure. The issues surrounding the separation of 
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conjoined twins raised in this article are in no way exhaustive. Rather, they are merely the 
starting point for a more holistic inquiry that intersects the fields of law, ethics, and morality. 
